The Potent Effects of Cannabis and Cocaine

This weekend, news about a tennis player halting a match due to the smell of cannabis captured global attention.

Among the many social media comments, one chairperson from a Committee on Drugs suggested that the incident at the US Open, when Aryna Sabalenka stopped play, might not just be about one person smoking.

According to his LinkedIn profile, Matej Košir has been the director at the Institute for Research and Development for 20 years, focusing on prevention science, youth risk behaviour, and policies related to alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs.

Since 2023, he has served as chairperson of the Vienna Committee on Drugs, contributing to global discussions on drug policy and prevention.

His goal is to promote professional exchange and collaboration to improve research and practical solutions addressing challenges related to alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs worldwide.

In his commentary, Matej Košir observes that the real news from the US Open is that when the smell of cannabis becomes a feature at sporting events, a change has occurred, especially considering that organizations spent decades eliminating tobacco smoke from stadiums.

Prevention science has long shown that social norms shape behavior, policies shape social norms, and commercial interests often influence policies.

Since January 2025, Sewa News has published blogs examining the stalemate in Sierra Leone and how sovereignty and state protection are enabling Europe’s most wanted drug lord.

The case of Johannes "Jos" Leijdekkers is often cited as an example of Europe’s cocaine dilemma, involving aid, trade, sovereignty, and Leijdekkers’ rise to “viceroy” in Sierra Leone.

This deadlock exposes the power of cocaine, corruption, and the EU’s difficulties in capturing a cartel leader.

It highlights the conflict between sovereignty and justice, explaining why Europe struggles to apprehend its most notorious drug lord while ordinary Sierra Leoneans suffer.

Europe is trying to secure Jos Leijdekkers and reduce West African trafficking, but these efforts face obstacles because of sovereign immunity and high-level political resistance.

European countries cannot arrest suspects or conduct operations on other nations’ sovereign territory, and law enforcement stalls when host governments are uncooperative or compromised.

These geopolitical and structural challenges complicate efforts to arrest individuals like Leijdekkers and maintain stability in transit areas.

Investigative reports and leaked footage reveal that Leijdekkers—sentenced in absentia by Dutch courts—has connections to Sierra Leone’s political elite.

Although European intelligence has pinpointed his location, local authorities have repeatedly ignored requests or denied knowledge, rendering standard extradition requests legally invalid.

European police and special forces cannot conduct raids or arrests independently within sovereign African nations without official permission.

Covert operations risk sparking violent diplomatic incidents or breaching international sovereignty.

To encourage cooperation from uncooperative governments, the Netherlands and its European partners have gone beyond standard extradition requests, urging the European Union to leverage its development aid subsidies.

However, reducing aid could destabilise local populations further or push governments toward other global powers that do not impose anti-corruption conditions.

Security arrangements in African transit centers are underfunded, borders are porous, and customs services are easily overwhelmed or corrupted by drug cartels with access to billions in drug money.

When pressure rises in one country (e.g., as Leijdekkers moves from Turkey and Dubai to West Africa), cartels swiftly shift logistics to neighboring countries with weaker rule of law, complicating local solutions.

Leijdekkers is wanted by Dutch authorities for cocaine trafficking offenses.

The debate over EU development subsidies for countries like Sierra Leone—highlighted recently by the Dutch intention to suspend funding to protect high-profile fugitives like Jos "Bolle Jos" Leijdekkers—illustrates the conflict in foreign aid theory between conditionality and humanitarian impact.

Critics argue that withholding aid is necessary to punish political elites harboring cartels, but European institutions and international aid organizations often hesitate to cut direct funding due to strategic and ethical concerns: EU aid (such as the €352 million multi-year allocation to Sierra Leone) typically supports healthcare, education, clean water, infrastructure, and food security.

Sudden subsidy withdrawal harms ordinary citizens already facing economic hardship and local violence.

Corrupt officials and political figures enriched by illegal drug activities are largely unaffected by aid cuts. Completely cutting state support risks macroeconomic collapse or civil unrest.

In fragile political contexts, destabilization could turn a country into a full-scale "narco-state," with law enforcement dissolving and cartels gaining unrestricted operational freedom along the regional coast.

When economic pressure pushes a state away from European alignment, regimes may seek financial support from rival non-Western powers or shadow economies that impose no anti-corruption or human rights conditions.

European security relies on West African partners for maritime operations, intelligence sharing, and controlling transnational smuggling routes.

If diplomatic and financial ties are severed, remaining institutional frameworks will collapse, undermining efforts to combat organized crime locally.

Since individual EU member states like the Netherlands cannot unilaterally suspend general EU aid programmes, Brussels typically adjusts aid rather than cancelling it entirely, channeling funds directly through NGOs and UN agencies and imposing targeted sanctions on specific officials instead of broad cuts that would endanger the general population.

Jos Leijdekkers remains the de facto ruler of Sierra Leone, and cocaine shipments continue from Sierra Leone to Europe.

This is the current reality, despite not being part of any official strategy—it results from diplomatic paralysis.

Known as Bolle Jos, Leijdekkers has secured immunity by becoming embedded in Sierra Leone’s political elite, particularly through his connection to Agnes Bio, daughter of President Julius Maada Bio, and protection from the country’s security forces.

This strong local protection, combined with established maritime shipping routes, keeps West Africa a thriving cocaine transit hub to Europe.

The situation persists not because Western powers approve, but because the EU faces a zero-sum dilemma: sending law enforcement into Sierra Leone would violate international law, and diplomatic pressure stalls if President Bio’s government refuses to arrest or extradite him.

While withdrawing EU development aid might seem an effective punishment on paper, in practice, elite groups with cartel money remain largely unaffected, while cuts to hospitals, clean water, and food security immediately harm civilians.

Risking government bankruptcy or instability could lead to Sierra Leone’s collapse and ungovernability.

A lawless vacuum would grant cartels even greater freedom to traffic drugs into Europe unchecked.

Without decisive, targeted action—such as sanctions on overseas assets of politicians providing protection—Leijdekkers and his network will continue operating with impunity.

Viewing this paralysis as a deliberate strategy to benefit European cocaine users is mistaken; it is an unintended structural consequence.

Although European consumers enjoy steady supply and lower prices, the trade severely impacts Europe’s broader social, political, and institutional systems.

Freetown’s role as a transit hub means high-purity cocaine reaches European entry points like Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg without major supply disruptions.

Stable supply chains prevent shortages and keep street prices steady with high purity.

While individual buyers benefit, European governments and societies face significant negative consequences far outweighing any consumer convenience.

The money made from continuous shipments directly supports well-armed criminal networks that are active within the EU, leading to gang warfare, assassinations, and bombings in the major port cities of Europe.

The huge amounts of money gained from drugs are not only used to buy officials in West Africa; they are being used more and more to pay bribes to port workers, customs officers, and local officials in European countries.

The widespread addiction results in millions of users, together with a rise in emergency healthcare costs and billions being spent on domestic law enforcement and judicial processing.

The fact that a fugitive such as Leijdekkers can operate openly sets a clear precedent: sovereign borders and local corruption can override European law enforcement.

The deadlock is not meant to make buyers happy; rather, it results from European countries being bound by rigorous legal frameworks, wanting to avoid major humanitarian crises overseas, and being influenced by a geopolitical situation that treats state sovereignty as almost absolute.

The benefit to the consumer is nothing more than a byproduct of a system which is based on limitations imposed by law enforcement.

State sovereignty may be absolute, but financial networks aren't.

In other words, Experts in international law enforcement and forensic accounting who are keeping an eye on Jos "Bolle Jos" Leijdekkers have managed to work out where his illegal earnings end up.

Drug money is rarely kept in ordinary bank accounts; instead, it is distributed throughout a global shadow financial system which is set up specifically to avoid Western banking regulations:

Dubai serves as a main vault for the preservation of wealth by European cartels. The Dutch prosecutors state that Leijdekkers employed shell companies and local agents to buy luxury apartments and commercial real estate.

The fact that Dubai has always had strict financial privacy laws and a property market that accepts cash enables cartel leaders to turn their liquid drug profits into legitimate brick-and-mortar assets.

Within six months, intercepted communications showed Leijdekkers had spent about €47 million to buy nearly 1,000 kilograms of gold.

Gold is the most anonymous form of currency because it has a high value, can be kept in private vaults not operated by banks, can be melted down to hide serial numbers, and is easy to trade through unregulated bullion markets in the Middle East and Africa.  

Turkey was also a major hub. As part of Leijdekkers’ network, real estate—such as hotels—along with cash businesses was acquired.

Although Turkish authorities eventually stopped part of the network by arresting his family members and taking over dozens of properties, much of the capital had already been incorporated into the local economy or sent elsewhere through trusted proxy networks. 

To stay insulated, Leijdekkers cleans millions of euros through trusted family members and associates.

Dutch and Turkish police have focused on his inner circle, exposing money trails tied to luxury assets, cars (like Bentleys), high-end watches (such as Patek Philippe and Audemars Piguet), and diamond transactions in Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Istanbul.

To avoid triggering alarms in the Western financial system, drug cartels rely heavily on the Hawala system, which involves depositing cash in one country and paying it out in another without either physical money crossing borders or going through SWIFT banking channels.

Dutch prosecutors have issued a record confiscation order exceeding 200 million euros against his network.

Yet, as long as non-EU financial safe havens allow purchases of real estate on the basis of cash, gold trades, and proxy holdings, his money stays active and protected.   

Despite serious concerns about its governance and anti-corruption measures, Western leaders still approach and invite President Julius Maada Bio.

Western powers treat him as an indispensable partner not out of ignorance, but due to several geopolitical calculations:

Western powers focus on stopping African countries from fully aligning with non-Western security groups, such as Russia's Africa Corps, for fear that if they alienate them, Sierra Leone might enter financial or military agreements with organizations that do not require adherence to anti-corruption or democratic standards.

Sierra Leone holds key elected positions in international organizations—including a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council—and Western countries depend on Bio's government for important votes and support on global diplomatic initiatives.

The states must cooperate to deal with piracy, human trafficking, and the expansion of jihadist groups towards the Atlantic coast.

Even if drug cartels manage to undermine certain aspects of the state, the Western intelligence agencies prefer to act via an official government rather than functioning in a stateless situation.

For Western capitals, isolating Bio would weaken their broader objectives in counter-terrorism and diplomacy in West Africa; therefore, European and American leadership is sticking to a pragmatic policy of public engagement while also trying to address corruption through back channels.

While Western diplomats are considering foreign aid policies and the cartels are accumulating wealth, it is the ordinary people who have to suffer the actual cost.

Sierra Leoneans are trapped in a compounding crisis where high-level narco-state collusion directly ruins lives on the ground:

The arrival of illicit drug networks has led to a severe domestic drug problem.

A cheap synthetic drug called "kush"—usually mixed with synthetic opioids such as nitazenes—has spread throughout Freetown. It is causing widespread destruction among young people of a whole generation, placing a heavy strain on healthcare facilities, and increasing street violence.  

Millions of people are living in extreme poverty, with high levels of food insecurity and rapidly rising living expenses. Instead of investing in schools, roads, or hospitals, capital flows into shadow economies, bribes, and security forces used to protect political elites rather than the general public.  

Deep-rooted corruption hollows out local institutions. Police and judiciary are compromised by cartel payouts, which leave ordinary citizens with virtually no protection or access to real justice.

The tragedy of the situation is that while international debates focus on abstract concepts like regional stability, the people on the ground pay the daily price of living under an insulated political class funded by foreign drug money.

The United States maintains a robust economic presence in Sierra Leone, driven by major companies and significant development investments.

Key U.S. firms operate across energy, finance, agriculture, mining, and professional services, supporting both infrastructure growth and economic diversification.

Annual U.S.-Sierra Leone trade in goods averages $150–$170 million, while overall U.S. engagement—including development finance and strategic funding—exceeds $500 million.

We reviewed reports on the principal U.S. companies active in Sierra Leone, highlighting major sectors of opportunity and outlining the scale and impact of U.S. trade and development initiatives shaping the country’s economic landscape.

The main U.S. companies that are either operating or carrying out major projects in Sierra Leone are Milele Energy / TCQ Power, which is a development partner for large-scale power projects involving utilities; Western Union and MoneyGram, firms providing financial services and offering international money transfer facilities; Seaboard Corporation, a company concentrating on agricultural processing, the distribution of grain, and food supply chains; PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Deloitte, firms that provide expertise in auditing, tax services, and consulting; and petroleum exploration companies (such as Kosmos Energy) that are involved in offshore oil and gas exploration and hold historical and exploratory licenses.

The key sectors and areas of industrial opportunity cover:

Energy and power infrastructure, including thermal, solar, and grid modernization projects aimed at tackling power shortages

Mining and the extractive industries, such as the exploration for rutile, bauxite, iron ore, gold, and diamonds, along with the supply of heavy equipment

Agriculture and agribusiness, comprising commercial farming, rice milling, cocoa processing, and food technology

Infrastructure and construction, involving transportation, port logistics, road construction, and civil engineering, and Telecommunications and IT, with opportunities in mobile financial services, network equipment, and digital connectivity.

As stated in published reports, the total bilateral economic activity between the United States and Sierra Leone consists of standard two-way trade in goods and substantial U.S. government strategic energy and development funding.

U.S. exports to Sierra Leone amount to about $115 million to $120 million and include vehicles, machinery, medical equipment, agricultural products, and processed food.

U.S. imports from Sierra Leone are valued between $10 million and $50 million and consist of titanium ores (rutile), cocoa, coffee, and special mineral specimens. U.S. strategic and development funding amounts to approximately $400 million to $480 million.

Major development commitments include allocations from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for power loans and from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for its compacts.

Total annual bilateral goods trade generally ranges from $150 million to $170 million, and overall U.S. economic engagement exceeds $500 million when the multi-year U.S. DFC energy loans and the MCC infrastructure development compacts are included.